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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the factors underlying firm failure and contrasts the failure mechanisms for 
young firms from those of older organizations. We suggest that there are systematic differences 
between the determinants of firm failure for firms that fail early in life and those that fail after 
having successfully negotiated the early liabilities of newness and adolescence. Data from 339 
Canadian corporate bankruptcies confirm that younger firms fail because of inadequacies in 
managerial knowledge, and financial management abilities. Older firms, on the other hand, are 
more likely to fail because of an inability to adapt to environmental change. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
One of the fundamental questions in strategic management and entrepreneurship research is why 
some firms fail and others do not. The vast majority of organizational research has concentrated 
on successful firms. Yet, despite evidence that a failure is a more likely fate than survival for 
new firms, failures remain an understudied population. Further, much of the research on 
discontinuance has been conducted at the macro-level, examining population dynamics and the 
patterns of entry and exit over time. In the present study, we seek to contribute to our 
understanding of one specific type of failure—bankruptcy—and the causes underlying such 
failures for firms of different ages. 
 
A clear and consistent finding of prior research is that firms face the highest failure risk when 
they are young and small. But if there are factors other than the liabilities of newness and 
smallness that contribute to firm failure, what are they and how can their influence be mitigated? 
From the perspective of the resource-based view of the firm, firms will fail if they are unable to 
generate self-sustaining levels of organizational rents. For new firms, the critical challenge then 
is to establish valuable resources and capabilities before initial asset endowments are depleted. 
Among older firms, which have survived the liabilities of newness, it is imperative to ensure that 
resources and capabilities continue to provide value as the competitive landscape changes. Thus, 
we should observe different causal mechanisms between firms that fail early and those that fail at 
a later stage. Young failures should be attributable to inadequate resources and capabilities 
(relative to initial endowments). Older failures should be attributable to a mismatch between 
resources and capabilities and strategic industry factors. 
 
We evaluate the general proposition that the causes of failure vary as a function of firm age with 
data from a sample of 339 Canadian bankruptcies. By examining instances of bankruptcy in 
some detail, we are able to extend our knowledge of mortality dynamics beyond the scope of 
age, size, and population density mechanisms. Specifically, we examine the relationship between 
firm age at failure and firm-level resources and capabilities, along with industry competitive 
conditions. We argue that while age is strongly correlated with probability of survival or failure, 
there is an underlying, resource-based process at work. Over time, firms succeed or fail as a 
function of their ability to create and sustain value through the deployment of strategic assets. 
Bankruptcy, a specific type of discontinuance, occurs when a firm can no longer meet its 
financial obligations; it has failed to generate sufficient rents to remain a going concern. We 
suggest that, after controlling for size and industry membership, bankruptcy among younger 
firms is attributable to different causes than bankruptcy among older firms. The data provide 
support for our contention that failure does occur for different reasons as a function of firm age. 
The findings are consistent with the expectations of the resource-based view, and complementary 
to population-level studies of mortality.  
 
The existence of firm-specific failure determinants offers support to the resource-based theory of 
the firm, and contributes a more-fine-grained perspective to the study of organizational ecology. 
Our finding that a lack of managerial competencies is implicated in bankruptcy outcomes is 
consistent with the resource-based view's (RBV) perspective that firm performance is a function 
of intangible processes. The role of environmental change supports both the selection argument 
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of organization ecology and the RBV emphasis on strategic assets and strategic industry factors. 
In other words, the environment, age, and size all matter, but there is more to the puzzle than 
these three components. This last implication should be of particular interest to managers. If the 
quality of management makes a difference for a population of failures, it surely matters for 
successful firms. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the fundamental questions in strategic management and entrepreneurship research is why 
some firms fail and others do not. The vast majority of organizational research has concentrated 
on successful firms. Yet, despite evidence that a failure is a more likely fate than survival for 
new firms, failures remain an understudied population (Baldwin et al., 1997; Bruderl, 
Preisendorfer and Ziegler, 1992). Further, much of the research on discontinuance has been 
conducted at the macro-level, examining population dynamics and the patterns of entry and exit 
over time. In the present study, we seek to contribute to our understanding of one specific type of 
failure—bankruptcy—and the causes underlying such failures for firms of different ages. 
 
A clear and consistent finding of prior research is that firms face the highest failure risk when 
they are young and small (Carroll, 1983; Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). But if there are factors 
other than the liabilities of newness and smallness that contribute to firm failure (McGrath, 
1999), what are they and how can their influence be mitigated? From the perspective of the 
resource-based view of the firm, firms will fail if they are unable to generate self-sustaining 
levels of organizational rents (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). For new firms, the critical challenge 
then is to establish valuable resources and capabilities before initial asset endowments are 
depleted (Levinthal, 1991). Among older firms, which have survived the liabilities of newness, it 
is imperative to ensure that resources and capabilities continue to provide value as the 
competitive landscape changes. Thus, we should observe different causal mechanisms between 
firms that fail early and those that fail at a later stage. Young failures should be attributable to 
inadequate resources and capabilities (relative to initial endowments). Older failures should be 
attributable to a mismatch between resources and capabilities and strategic industry factors. 
 
We evaluate the general proposition that the causes of failure vary as a function of firm age with 
unique data from a sample of Canadian bankruptcies. By examining instances of bankruptcy in 
some detail, we are able to extend our knowledge of mortality dynamics beyond the scope of 
age, size, and population density mechanisms. Specifically, we examine the relationship between 
firm age at failure and firm-level resources and capabilities, along with industry competitive 
conditions. The data provide support for our contention that failure does occur for different 
reasons as a function of firm age. The findings are consistent with the expectations of the 
resource-based view, and complementary to population-level studies of mortality.  
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2.  Theory 
 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm depicts firms as heterogeneous bundles of 
idiosyncratic, hard-to-imitate resources and capabilities (e.g., Barney, 1991; Conner, 1991; 
Rumelt, 1984, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). Amit and Schoemaker (1993) posited that a firm’s 
ability to capture economic rents is a function of how such capabilities are used to deploy and 
utilize a firm’s resources. In their view, resources are “stocks of available factors that are owned 
or controlled by the firm” (1993: 35). Capabilities are “information-based, tangible or intangible 
processes that are firm-specific and are developed over time through complex interactions among 
the firm’s resources” (1993, p. 35). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) added a dynamic element to 
this view by arguing that “the competitive advantage of firms lies with its managerial and 
organizational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset position, and the path available to it.” 
(1997, p. 518). 
 
Amit and Schoemaker’s (1993) model of Strategic Assets and Organizational Rents suggests that 
both the internally controlled resources and capabilities (R&C) of a firm, and the externally 
determined strategic industry factors (SIF) determine whether a firm has strategic assets (SA) 
necessary to generate economic rents. Thus, organizational rents are more likely when R&C are 
aligned with SIF. Conversely, failure becomes more likely in the case of misalignment between 
what the firm can do and what the competitive environment requires. 
 
New firms are able to observe the competitive environment before entry into a particular market. 
Except for very rare circumstances, new entrants must take competitive conditions as exogenous 
and craft their strategies accordingly. The creation of value-generating strategic assets thus 
depends on the ability to develop and manage appropriate R&C. This challenge is amplified by 
resource constraints and the absence of established organizational routines. 
 
The critical role of organizational routines was articulated by Stinchcombe (1965) in his seminal paper 
on the liability of newness. He identified four aspects of new organizations that make them more prone 
to failure than older, more established organizations: (a) new organizations must get by with general 
knowledge until members learn new, specific roles and functions, (b) during the role identification and 
formation process, there may be conflict, worry, and inefficiency, (c) relations with outside individuals 
and organizations must be forged, and an initial lack of trust may be a liability, and (d) new 
organizations lack stable ties with the customers they wish to serve. 
 
In addition to the organizational liabilities noted by Stinchcombe, young firms may also lack 
knowledge about what they can do or should do (Jovanovic, 1982), or may not be sufficiently 
endowed with the requisite resources to execute their strategy (Lussier, 1995; Venkataraman, 
Van de Ven, Buckeye and Hudson, 1990). Fichman and Levinthal (1991) suggest that the 
liability of newness is not a monotonically decreasing function of firm age, but that there is an 
initial “honeymoon” period during which initial assets buffer the new organization. They argue 
that variations in the levels of initial assets affect the way time affects mortality rates. The time 
dependence occurs because the longer an organization survives (due to initial capital 
endowments), the more it will be able to develop relationship-specific capital and adapt to the 
environment. 
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In another interpretation of the observed mortality patterns of young organizations, Levinthal 
(1991) developed a random-walk model comprised of the initial stock of organizational capital 
and the process governing the change in organizational capital over time. Based on the random-
walk model, he argued that there is no direct link between an organization’s age and its reduced 
mortality risk. Older firms experience reduced mortality rates not because they are old but 
because their prior successes buffer them from current pressures. Organizational changes such as 
increased reliability and competence are thus not necessary to explain the declining mortality 
risk that accompanies age. Levinthal concluded that age might be a proxy for the broader 
construct of organizational capital. 
 
The interaction between firm resources, industry factors, and probable survival outcomes is 
depicted graphically in Figure 1. In this diagram, the desired state is position C in which the 
external requirements are well-understood and firm R&C have value in the competitive context. 
New firms may begin in position B, from which the industry factors can be observed and 
understood, but the task of creating valuable competitive assets remains. Firms that can create 
and exploit valuable R&C before their initial assets are exhausted may escape the liability of 
newness and move to position C. 
 
Figure 1.  Liabilities and Strategic Assets 
 
 
R & C 
Low Value 
R & C 
High Value 
S.I.F. Well 
Understood 
S.I.F. Poorly 
Understood 
Liability of Newness Organizational Rents 
Liability of Obsolescence Liability of Ignorance 
C B 
A D 
Strategic Assets enable firm to 
capture value and prosper 
Survival depends on ability to develop S.A. 
before initial assets are depleted 
 
Low probability of survival without significant 
initial assets to support learning S.I.F. and 
developing valuable R & C 
Failure risk increases as firm R & C fall 
out of synch with requirements of the 
competitive environment 
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Position A in Figure 1 also captures an aspect of the liability of newness. Firms in this position 
lack clear knowledge of industry requirements and the wherewithal to create and capture value. 
While moving from A to C is not impossible, it requires extraordinary learning and/or the 
presence of a significant initial endowment. Firms in both A and B share the burden of R&C 
deficiencies, which must be overcome if they are to emerge from their hazardous period of 
newness. 
 
Firms that survive through the early years face very different issues than do young enterprises. 
As noted by Aldrich and Auster (1986), “the major problem facing smaller and younger 
organizations is survival, whereas larger and older organizations face the problem of strategic 
transformation” (1986, p. 193). The established routines of older organizations, which in many 
cases were critical to their initial survival, can become liabilities in the face of changing 
competitive conditions (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Organizational ecology asserts that the 
environment will select out unfit organizations, and that the ability to survive over time is a 
function of whether an organization is suited to both the current environment and the way in 
which the environment changes and evolves. Misalignment with the environment may expose 
firms to a liability of obsolescence (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994). Whether an organization 
ages well or badly thus depends on whether the effects of learning over time result in increased 
(positive) competence or increased (negative) rigidity (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). In many 
instances, managers simply do not acknowledge that previously successful strategic postures 
have become uncompetitive (Harrigan, 1985, 1988). 
 
Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993) noted that while older organizations may be severely 
affected by change, they are often well suited to withstand shocks by virtue of their accumulated 
asset stocks. Selection due to environmental change should affect those firms that have endured 
long enough to establish set routines and procedures, but that lack the ability to change as 
required by the evolution of their market or industry context. The tension between resource slack 
and efficiency is well known. In stable environments, the efficiency of older organizations 
should be an asset; however this can quickly become a liability in unstable or uncertain markets. 
 
From the strategic assets framework, we suggest that firms will fail when the organizational rents 
become insufficient to support continuing operations. This will occur when R&C lose value 
relative to the demands of the environment. If firms fail because of an inability to adapt to 
changing competitive circumstances, this represents a significantly different process of failure 
than that articulated by the liability of newness. In Figure 1, this can be seen as the transition 
from position C to D. 
 
For any firm, failure will be the result of insufficient rent generation. For young firms, with a 
given initial endowment, having R&C that are well matched to SIF will enhance the prospects of 
initial survival. For older firms, sustaining the connection between internal R&C and external 
SIF is what matters. In sum, the theoretical tenets of the liabilities of newness and obsolescence 
are consistent with the strategic assets and organizational rents framework of the resource-based 
view. As presented in Figure 1, age is not the prime determinant of mortality, despite the strong 
correlative evidence that age is a strong predictor of failure. Instead, age is a proxy for internal 
organizational processes that evolve over time; the alignment or misalignment of firm 
capabilities with the competitive landscape. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
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H1: Failure of young firms will be attributable to different causes than failure of 
older firms. 
 
The nature of the causal differences is evident in Figure 1. Specifically, we propose that young 
organizations will suffer from resource and capability deficiencies. This is the essence of the 
liability of newness expressed in the language of the RBV. Older firms, having presumably 
developed valuable R&C in their evolution from being young to being older, will be prone to 
misalignment with strategic industry factors. Thus, a resource-based perspective can also be 
applied to the liability of obsolescence. The age-specific failure dynamics are stated more 
formally in the following hypotheses. 
 
H2: Failure of older firms will be attributable to changes in Strategic Industry 
Factors. 
 
H3: Failure of young firms will be attributable to deficiencies in Resources and 
Capabilities 
 
The latter hypothesis regarding the role of R&C in the liability of newness is amenable to greater 
refinement. Resources and capabilities encompass a broad array of assets, tangible and 
intangible, as well as numerous ways of deploying such assets in the pursuit of economic rents. 
Levinthal (1991) observed that firms fail when poor performance erodes asset stocks. His 
definition of assets includes not only financial assets, but also market position, distribution 
systems, manufacturing infrastructure, and technological capabilities. Levinthal refers to this 
conglomeration of financial and non-financial assets as “organizational capital.” D’Aveni (1989) 
describes organizations as accumulators of financial and managerial assets. The net asset base of 
a firm influences the risk of default to creditors. We can thus describe young firms as being 
prone to shortages of tangible assets (e.g., real capital) and/or intangible assets (e.g., human 
capital). 
 
A review of prior research makes it clear that the fitness of a firm is damaged by managerial 
deficiencies in a number of areas (Gaskill, Van Auken and Manning, 1993; Larson and Clute, 
1979; McKinlay, 1979). Younger firms may have greater difficulty generating revenues while 
concurrently dealing with a variety of start-up costs that older enterprises have long since 
absorbed. From our review of firm-level empirical studies (see Table 1), general management 
and financial planning and control were the most commonly cited contributors to firm mortality. 
The development of a sound product-market strategy is also identified in the literature. 
Consistent with our position that firm-specific R&C, rather than age, are critical to survival or 
demise, we suggest that general, financial, and marketing management deficiencies will play a 
greater role in the failure of young firms than older businesses. 
 
The crux of our argument is that the liability of newness has specific elements that originate with 
the management of a firm. For example, as firms age and managers gain greater breadth and 
depth of knowledge about customers, suppliers, competitors, etc., any knowledge deficiencies in 
these domains will become less of a liability. Young firms will thus be more prone to failure as a 
function of general management knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
 
Table 1.  Empirical Studies of Organizational Mortality 
 
 Firm Attributes Owner/Manager Attributes Operational Characteristics 
 Age Size Industry/ 
Environ. 
Initial 
Capital 
Age Education Experience Performance Prod/Mkt 
Strategy 
General 
Mgmt 
Financial 
Control 
POPULATION-LEVEL STUDIES            
Amburgey et al. (1993) X  X         
Bates (1990) X X  X X X      
Bates and Nucci (1989) X X      X    
Bruderl and Schussler (1990) X X          
Carroll (1983) X  X         
Carroll and Delacroix (1982) X  X         
Carroll and Huo (1986)   X         
Dunne et al. (1988) X X X         
Freeman et al. (1983) X X          
Levinthal (1991) X X  X        
Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) X X X         
Preisendorfer and Voss (1990) X  X  X  X     
Ranger-Moore (1997) X X X     X    
Stearns et al. (1995)   X      X   
MULTI-LEVEL STUDIES            
Fichman and Levinthal (1991) X X  X        
Gimeno et al. (1997) X X    X X     
Henderson (1999) X X X     X X   
Pennings et al. (1998) X     X X     
Singh et al. (1986) X  X         
Singh et al. (1986) X  X         
FIRM-LEVEL STUDIES            
Baldwin et al. (1997)          X X 
Boardman et al. (1981) X X X     X  X  
Bruderl et al. (1992)      X X     
Carter et al. (1997)    X  X X  X   
Cooper et al. (1994)   X X  X X    X 
Daily (1995)  X         X 
D’Aveni (1989)   X   X X X    
Fredland and Morris (1976) X X X    X     
Gaskill et al. (1993)   X  X X  X  X X 
Hall (1992) X X X X     X X  
Hall (1994) X X   X X      
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) X X X       X  
Kalleberg and Leicht (1991) X  X    X     
Keasey and Watson (1987) X    X   X    
Larson and Clute (1979)          X X 
Litvak and Maule (1980)          X X 
Lussier (1995)    X X X X    X 
McKinlay (1979)        X  X X 
Mitchell (1991)            
Mitchell (1994)   X    X X    
Mitchell et al. (1994)        X    
Moulton and Thomas (1993)  X       X   
O'Neill and Duker (1986)   X         
Venkataraman et al. (1990) X X  X        
A
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General management skills have been implicated in several studies of firm mortality (e.g., 
Larson and Clute, 1979; Wichman, 1983, Gaskill, et al., 1993). Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon and 
Woo (1994) noted that “management know-how may affect the performance of the firm through 
more promising strategies or better management methods” (1994, p. 374). They further 
suggested that industry-specific know-how would benefit firms by “providing a tacit 
understanding of the key success factors in an industry, specialized knowledge of the product or 
technologies, or accumulated goodwill with customers and/or suppliers” (1994, p. 374-375). 
 
H3a: Failure of young firms will be attributable to deficiencies in general 
management skills. 
 
Boardman, Bartley and Ratliff (1981) examined the issue of financial management and firm 
failure. In addition to the oft-cited issue of insufficient capital at inception, they also noted that 
unsuccessful managers also mismanaged those resources that were available and/or failed to 
determine appropriate policies to finance subsequent growth of the business. Their empirical 
results also reveal that “failed companies exhibited an increasingly unfavourable position with 
respect to the size of long-term debt to total assets” (1981, p. 39). The management of capital and 
the maintenance of an appropriate capital structure are thus critical for firm survival. 
 
H3b: Failure of young firms will be attributable to deficiencies in financial 
management skills. 
 
Developing a customer base is critical to the survival of any business, regardless of industry or 
the nature of the product or service offering. Inefficient marketing was explicitly identified as a 
cause of failure in Hall’s (1992) comprehensive study of business failure in the U.K. Mitchell 
(1994), in his study of the medical equipment product market, concluded that “From a combined 
economic and ecological perspective, a business ceases to be a candidate for dissolution as soon 
as it creates commercially successful routines” (1994, p. 599). Litvak and Maule (1980), in a 
longitudinal study of business failures, reported that “The most significant business problem area 
was that of marketing, of the lack of it” (1980, p. 76). Our final hypothesis focuses on this 
specific aspect of managerial competence. 
 
H3c: Failure of young firms will be attributable to deficiencies in market 
development skills. 
 
In summary, we argue that while age is strongly correlated with probability of survival or failure, 
there is an underlying, resource-based process at work. Over time, firms succeed or fail as a 
function of their ability to create and sustain value through the deployment of strategic assets. 
Bankruptcy, a specific type of discontinuance, occurs when a firm can no longer meet its 
financial obligations; it has failed to generate sufficient rents to remain a going concern. In the 
next section, we evaluate our hypotheses with data from 339 bankruptcies. 
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3.  Methods 
 
 
Our empirical analysis includes only bankrupt firms. This restricted set of business exits 
excludes other types of firm exits (i.e., discontinuances) that are typically captured in 
organizational ecology studies. However, it does capture failure in the extreme, and ensures that 
we do not confound orderly discontinuance or exit due to high performance thresholds with true 
failure. Firms that are insolvent to the point of legal proceedings have clearly failed to meet the 
market’s threshold of fulfilling their financial obligations. Cochrane (1981) depicted failure as a 
series of nested conditions. The most general definition is discontinuance. Then, in increasing 
order of specificity and decreasing order of subset size are; (1) failures as opportunity costs; (2) 
termination with losses or to avoid losses, and; (3) bankruptcy. Performance thresholds are also 
important to consider in the context of business failures. Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo (1997) 
established that a significant factor in the continuance-discontinuance decision for many 
entrepreneurs is their own acceptable threshold of performance. Firms that appear to be 
underperformers may persist if their thresholds are sufficiently low while other, relatively 
superior performers may exit if their thresholds are sufficiently high. 
 
The data set, described below, is comprised entirely of firms that have exited by way of 
bankruptcy. We are therefore unable to investigate the issues of survival versus failure; for this, 
it would be necessary to have matching information on both failures and survivors. There is, 
however, much that can be learned from a post-mortem analysis of failures. The research 
question and the answers we glean are different from the more usual queries into survival and 
discontinuance. We propose that the determinants of failure vary as a function of firm age at 
failure. To understand whether this is so, we feel that it is appropriate to examine a sample of 
unsuccessful companies. Research into determinants of firm success routinely examines relative 
success within samples of surviving enterprises. The fact that failures are not included in such 
samples does not preclude the studies from contributing to our understanding of managerial 
processes. In a similar vein, the present analysis is focused solely on an understudied segment of 
the economy that has demonstrated its lack of viability. The ability to dig down into the causes of 
failure by studying specific instances, rather than macro-economic indicators, is a unique 
strength of our data. 
 
Data 
 
The data used in this study is based on a survey of bankruptcy trustees who completed a 
questionnaire while they were handling active bankruptcy files. The real-time method of data 
collection mitigates problems of retrospective recall bias. The survey was developed with the 
Canadian Insolvency Practitioners Association and compiled by Statistics Canada (Baldwin et 
al., 1997). All corporate bankruptcies in Canada are processed through the office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcies, which assigns a trustee to each case. Chartered Insolvency 
Practitioners are individuals (typically, Chartered Accountants) who have completed three years 
of prescribed study under the National Insolvency Qualification Program and successfully 
completed the National Insolvency Examination. As independent, third-parties, the trustees can 
provide objective reporting of the circumstances of each bankruptcy. They thus bring valuable 
objectivity and experience in evaluating the causes of failure. 
 
Table 2.  Correlation Matrix and Summary Statistics  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
              
1 Firm Age 1.00             
2 Assets ($M) 0.19* 1.00            
3 Technological Change 0.12* -0.02 1.00           
4 Market Change 0.15* 0.06 0.62* 1.00          
5 Legal Change 0.08 0.01 0.32* 0.29* 1.00         
6 Capital Structure -0.01 0.13* 0.28* 0.23* 0.14* 1.00        
7 Undercapitalization -0.12* -0.02 0.16* 0.13* 0.12* 0.52* 1.00       
8 Breadth of Knowledge -0.12* 0.13* 0.09 0.02 0.12* 0.30* 0.28* 1.00      
9 Depth of Knowledge -0.06 0.12* 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.29* 0.29* 0.80* 1.00     
10 Operational Control -0.04 0.13* 0.19* 0.12* 0.13* 0.19* 0.19* 0.49* 0.52* 1.00    
11 Pricing -0.09 0.05 0.17* 0.20* 0.22* 0.27* 0.21* 0.30* 0.31* 0.20* 1.00   
12 Product Quality 0.06 -0.03 0.41* 0.39* 0.19* 0.18* 0.18* 0.08 0.11* 0.18* 0.24* 1.00  
13 Niche Marketing 0.06 -0.01 0.31* 0.29* 0.22* 0.13* 0.08 0.11* 0.18* 0.17* 0.33* 0.43* 1.00 
Mean 7.81 0.28 0.99 1.44 0.89 2.82 3.04 2.62 2.58 2.28 2.00 1.32 1.27 
Std. Dev. 7.83 0.67 1.06 1.37 0.93 1.79 1.70 1.47 1.48 1.57 1.46 1.22 1.16 
              
Correlation coefficients > 0.105 are significant at p < 0.05. 
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There were a total of 1,910 bankruptcies in Canada in the six-month period from March to 
August 1996.1  Surveys were sent to a random sample of trustees for 1085 of these cases and 550 
responses were obtained (51%). A total of 339 of these surveys contained complete responses to 
the items of interest to this research study, including the age of the business at the time of 
bankruptcy. Means, standard deviations, and inter-item correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
The dependent variable in our models is firm age at time of bankruptcy. Due to the highly 
skewed nature of the age distribution in our sample, we log-normalized age to better approximate 
a normal distribution. Twenty-nine percent of the firms in the sample were one or two years old 
at the time of bankruptcy, 40% were in the three- to-nine-year-old range, and the remaining 30% 
were ten years old or more. The mean age of the firms in our sample was 7.8 years (median 5.0). 
 
We use a total of four predictor variables to test our hypotheses. Our measure of industry 
competitive conditions is derived from survey items in which the bankruptcy trustees were asked 
to report on the extent to which the firm was affected by: (a) changes in market conditions, (b) 
changes in technology, and (c) legislative changes. Respondents used a 5-point Likert-type scale 
to indicate the extent to which a given factor contributed to the bankruptcy. Principal 
components analysis indicated that these items loaded strongly on a single factor with an 
Eigenvalue of 1.84. (See Appendix for details of survey questions, factor loadings and alpha 
coefficients). The derived factor variable serves as our proxy for the level of industry turbulence 
and change. This measure was used to evaluated our hypothesis on the liability of obsolescence 
(H2). 
 
We also used the principal components technique to create three other composite factor 
variables, each of which were used to evaluate our specific hypotheses on the liability of 
newness (H3). A general management factor was derived to test Hypothesis 3a based on the 
manager’s (a) breadth of knowledge, (b) depth of knowledge, (c) and control. Breadth was 
defined as the level of knowledge across functional areas (e.g., marketing, finance, operations), 
while depth was the extent of knowledge within the functions. The derived factor variable serves 
as a proxy for general managerial abilities. 
 
A two-item factor was used to test for the impact of financial management resources and 
capabilities within the failed organizations. The relative contribution of unbalanced capital 
structure and poor capitalization are captured in our variable for H3b. Our final variable for 
market development (H3c) evaluated the impact of (a) pricing strategy, (b) product quality, and 
(c) the establishment of market position. By decomposing the firm’s R&C into specific areas of 
general management, financial management, and market development, we are able to gain more 
detailed estimates about the causes of failure than would be possible through the use of more 
general proxies for organizational capital. 
                                                          
1 During the time of data collection, there were no extraordinary shocks or other triggering events that made this a 
noteworthy period of Canadian economic history. The Canadian economy typically shadows the dominant U.S. 
economy and, while different, should be representative of business processes in most OECD nations. The data 
collection period of six months was determined by dual considerations of desirable sample size and costs of data 
acquisition. 
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In addition to the independent variables described above, we also included control variables for 
industry membership and firm size in our regressions. Indicator variables were used for the 
following industry categories: (1) wholesale and retail (n1=132), (2) food, accommodation and 
beverages (n2=43), (3) other services (n3=93), and (4) primary and manufacturing industries 
(n4=71).
2  Seventy-eight percent of the bankrupt firms were in service industries, a proportion 
that is representative of the general composition of the Canadian economy (Baldwin et al., 1997; 
Thornhill and Amit, 1998, 2000). 
 
We also include a measure of firm size: assets at time of failure. The inclusion of this variable is 
more problematic in the study of bankruptcies than in studies of successful firms, for which the 
use of asset levels to define size is relatively unambiguous. In the case of defunct enterprises, it 
is highly probable that asset depletion has occurred along the road to ruin (Hambrick and 
D’Aveni, 1988). However, there is also a well-established relationship between size and 
likelihood of failure: the liability of smallness (c.f. Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; Baum and 
Oliver, 1991). Inclusion of firm asset level as a control variable is intended to capture variance 
associated with this known effect and thus improve our ability to evaluate the influence of the 
hypothesized age-specific relationships.3 
 
Analysis 
 
We utilized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to evaluate the effects of our control 
and predictor variables. The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 3. Two 
models are reported. The first includes our control variables plus the measure for industry change 
(H2). The second model includes all variables from Model 1 plus the three factor variables 
specified in Hypothesis 3.4 
 
The measure for firm size was positively and significantly associated with age at failure, 
confirming the expected age-size relationship. Two of the industry dummy variables were also 
significant. The positive sign of the coefficient for retail and wholesale indicates that failures in 
this industry segment were typically older firms, while the opposite effect was evident among 
firms in the food, accommodation and beverage sector. 
 
All three of the managerial variables had negative coefficients in the regression models, 
indicating greater influence among younger bankruptcies, although there was strong significance 
(p<0.05) for only general management (H3a) and weaker significance (p<0.10) for the financial 
management variable (H3b). Market development was not significant in the analysis. 
 
                                                          
2 The requisite omitted industry (4) primary and manufacturing industries in our models. When this industry is 
specified and another industry omitted as the base case (e.g., other services), it is not a significant predictor of age at 
failure. 
3 When the asset variable is excluded from the regressions, the results are qualitatively the same. 
4 In order to evaluate whether the inclusion of the management variables represented a significant improvement over 
Model 1, we calculated an F-statistic to compare the nested models (Hamilton, 1992). 
FHn-K =  (RSS{K-H} - RSS{K}) / df1       [1] 
[ RSS{K} / df2 ] 
The resulting F3330 = 4.14, which is significant at p<0.01. Thus, Model 2 is a significant improvement over Model 1 
in explanatory power. 
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Table 3.  Regression Results 
 
n=339 Model 1 
Controls and Industry 
Model 2 
All Variables 
Control Variables   
Firms Assets ($M) 0.246** 0.287*** 
Retail & Wholesale 0.281* 0.255 t 
Food, Accommodation. & Beverage -0.399* -0.416* 
Other Services -0.014 -0.090 
Predictor Variables   
H2:    Industry Change 0.088* 0.126** 
H3a: General Management  -0.086* 
H3b: Financial Management  -0.075t 
H3c: Market Development  -0.019 
Intercept 1.466*** 1.488*** 
F 7.71*** 6.50*** 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.115 
RSS 303.7 292.7 
Significance Levels (P-values):  t < 0.10;  * < 0.05;  ** < 0.01;  *** < 0.001 
Note: As an alternative test, we also ran regressions on the individual survey items and performed clustered f-tests of 
statistical significance. The results are qualitatively the same: (H3a) General Management: f(3,331) = 4.07; p < 0.08, 
(H3b) Financial Management: f(2,332) = 3.44; p < 0.03, (H3c) Market Development: f(3,331) = 1.82; p < 0.14. 
 
We may conclude from our regression results that there are, in fact, differences in the attributed 
causes of bankruptcy that vary as a function of age at failure. This supports Hypothesis 1. The 
positive, significant coefficient for industry change also provides support for the RBV 
interpretation of the liability of obsolescence as articulated in Hypothesis 2. Among the sub-
hypothesis offered as explanation for the liability of newness, there were varying degrees of 
support, permitting us only to conclude that Hypothesis 3 was partially supported by the data. 
 
A closer examination of the individual item mean scores (Table 2) reveals that, independent of 
size, age, or industry context, undercapitalization was the issue given the greatest importance by 
the bankruptcy trustees. Next, in decreasing order of importance (i.e., mean score) were capital 
structure problems, breadth of knowledge, depth of knowledge, financial planning and control, 
and product pricing strategy. These results are consistent with the studies cited in Table 1. 
 
Thus, while confirming that deficiencies in general management and financial management are 
common culprits in firm insolvency, the fresh findings to emerge from this research are the 
relationships between age at failure and the nature of the contributing causes. Younger firms are 
more likely to fail in food, accommodation and beverage industries, and due to problems with 
general management and financial management. Older failures on the other hand, are more likely 
to originate in wholesale or retail and to be subject to a turbulent competitive environment. These 
issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
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4.  Discussion 
 
 
In her recent paper on entrepreneurial failure and real options reasoning, McGrath (1999) noted 
that there are benefits to be gained from the study of failures. She stated “By carefully analyzing 
failures instead of focusing only on successes, scholars can begin to make systematic progress on 
better analytical models of entrepreneurial value creation” (1999, p. 28). In a similar vein, Sitkin 
(1992) suggested, “failure is an essential prerequisite for learning” (1992, p. 232). Studies of 
failure can contribute to the eventual success of those who learn from their own mistakes as well 
as those who can learn vicariously from the experiences of others. 
 
This paper represents an attempt to extend our understanding of the age-dependent mechanisms 
underlying firm failure. We began with the general proposition that there are different 
mechanisms at work when firms of differing ages become bankrupt. This perspective is an 
extension of the Amit and Schoemaker model of strategic assets and organizational rents. We 
suggest, as outlined in Figure 1, that younger firms expire if their initial asset endowments are 
exhausted before they are able to develop value-creating strategic assets. Such a situation will 
occur when resources and capabilities are not mobilized effectively and in step with the 
requirements of strategic industry success factors. Older firms, on the other hand, while having 
demonstrated the ability to survive the liabilities of newness, may find themselves in a non-
competitive position if they allow their resources and capabilities to lose relevance in a changing 
competitive environment. In this view, it is not youth or age that contribute to failure. Rather, age 
may be a proxy for underlying operational differences among firms that have been in existence 
for different periods of time. We hypothesized that, after controlling for size and industry 
membership, bankruptcy among younger firms would be attributable to different causes than 
bankruptcy among older firms. We tested our hypotheses using unique survey data from 
Canadian bankruptcy trustees and found varying degrees of support for the specified 
relationships. From this research, we can draw a number of conclusions and observations. 
 
First, our findings lend empirical support to the resource-based view of the firm. While much 
empirical work has sought to establish a link between firm resources and capabilities and 
success, the flip side of the coin implies that an absence of strategic assets should lead down the 
road to insolvency. Whether firms are young, and trying to establish a viable competitive 
position, or older and trying to maintain or grow as the environment changes, the match between 
R&C and critical industry factors is paramount. As originally stated by Amit & Schoemaker, "In 
sum, as the firm's environment changes, different sets of Strategic Assets may have to be 
developed by firms. Core Capabilities, by definition, cannot be purchased off the shelf, but 
require strategic vision, development time, and sustained investment. Decisions about Strategic 
Assets … are among the most complex that managers encounter" (1993, p. 42; italics in original). 
 
Second, this research contributes to a finer-grained understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
the well-known liability of newness. From Stinchcombe’s (1965) original statement of the 
concept through a wealth of population ecology refinement, there are few relationships in social 
science as well established as the negative correlation between age and the likelihood of failure. 
The value added by the present line of research comes from the articulation of the different, age-
dependent causal factors of one specific type of failure: bankruptcy. Young firms may have 
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knowledge of the industry, but suffer from a lack of valuable resources and capabilities. Older 
firms may have established resources and capabilities, but their value will diminish if not 
maintained relative to the demands of the competitive environment. 
 
Third, the results confirm that industry membership is relevant to firm survival. Failure at an 
early age was associated with membership in the food, beverage and accommodation sector. 
Businesses such as pubs and restaurants are notorious for being short-lived, and it has been 
suggested that these “unglamorous” businesses may be prone to different strategy/performance 
dynamics than are firms in manufacturing or high-tech sectors of the economy (Brush and 
Chaganti, 1999). In contrast, firms in wholesale and retail were more likely to be amongst the 
older cohort of bankruptcies. This may be a consequence of recent changes to industry practices. 
The emergence of Internet vendors and “big-box” outlet stores may be eroding the competitive 
position of established, traditional wholesale and retail businesses. This evidence, coupled with 
the positive relationship between age and environmental change is consistent with a liability of 
obsolescence among firms in rapidly evolving industries (Barron et al., 1994). 
 
Finally, this study adds credence to the view that there is value to be gained from the study of 
failed organizations. Just as medical science would be unlikely to progress by studying only 
healthy individuals, organization science may be limited in the knowledge attainable from the 
study of successful firms. 
 
While these results shed new light on why firms fail at different ages, the data are not without 
limitations. Perhaps most obvious is the fact that the sample is drawn from a population of 
bankrupt enterprises. Clearly, the inclusion of surviving firms with comparable demographic 
characteristics would allow us to generalize the findings and have greater confidence in the 
empirical analysis. However, post-mortem analysis is not without precedent, nor is it without 
value, and the differences that have emerged between the younger and older failed firms 
represent a meaningful contribution to our understanding of firm mortality.  
 
Two future lines of study suggested by this inquiry include (1) broadening the scope of exits 
under study to include modes of discontinuance other than bankruptcy and (2) contrasting young 
and old failures with a comparable population of young and old survivors. In each case, efforts 
should be made to reconcile observed population level dynamics with characteristics and 
behaviors that reflect the way firms do business. 
 
The existence of firm-specific failure determinants offers support to the resource-based theory of 
the firm, and contributes a more-fine-grained perspective to the study of organizational ecology. 
Our finding that a lack of managerial competencies is implicated in bankruptcy outcomes is 
consistent with the RBV’s perspective that firm performance is a function of intangible 
processes. The role of environmental change supports both the selection argument of 
organization ecology and the RBV emphasis on strategic assets and strategic industry factors. In 
other words, the environment, age, and size all matter, but there is more to the puzzle than these 
three components. This last implication should be of particular interest to managers. If the 
quality of management makes a difference for a population of failures, it surely matters for 
successful firms. 
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Appendix 1: Details of Bankruptcy Survey Items 
 
 
Survey items and inter-item summary statistics 
H2: Industry Turbulence and Change 
To what extent did the following factors contribute to bankruptcy: (Not at all (1) to (5) A great deal) 
        a) Fundamental change in technology within the industry 
        b) Fundamental change in market conditions within the industry (such as product obsolescence) 
        c) Labour or industrial relations legislation 
Eigenvalue: 1.84 Variance explained: 61%  Coefficient alpha: 0.68 
H3a: General Management 
To what extent was bankruptcy caused by deficiencies in: (Not at all (1) to (5) A great deal) 
        a) Breadth of knowledge (across financing, marketing, operations, etc.) 
        b) Depth of knowledge (within financing, marketing, operations, etc.) 
        c) Control 
Eigenvalue: 2.22 Variance explained: 74%  Coefficient alpha: 0.82 
H3b: Financial Management 
To what extent did the following contribute to insolvency: (Not at all (1) to (5) A great deal) 
        a) Unbalanced capital structure (e.g., excessive reliance on short term debt) 
        b) Under-capitalization 
Eigenvalue: 1.52 Variance explained: 76%  Coefficient alpha: 0.68 
H3c: Market Development 
To what extent was bankruptcy caused by: (Not at all (1) to (5) A great deal) 
        a) Poor pricing strategy (over- or under-pricing) 
        b) Inferior or poor quality of product 
        c) Failure to establish a market niche 
Eigenvalue: 1.67 Variance explained: 56%  Coefficient alpha: 0.58 
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